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The paper analyses the way in which monetary and fiscal policy influences the 
performances of economic growth and social welfare.. The analysis is made on the basis 
of a dynamic model with discrete variables . The model is with a representative private 
agent and a government sector consisting of a consolidated fiscal authority and central 
bank. Households, in each period, decide about consumption., investment in physical 
capital, and financial investment  in government bonds. The model is built in such a way 
that satisfaction of the budget constraint of the representative household implies 
satisfaction of the budget constraint of the government.   
  The model has two state variables: the first is private wealth (consisting of money, 
bonds and physical capital) , and the second is physical capital. The decision variables 
are: private nominal consumption , social nominal consumption and the amount of bonds 
bought by the private agent. 
  The optimality conditions are obtained by using the Maximum Principle for 
discrete dynamic systems. A qualitative analysis of the optimal trajectories is performed, 
on the basis of the information provided by the Maximum Principle, concerning the 
dynamics of the dual variables . 
  Finally, we analyze the influence of several monetary and fiscal decisions on the 
optimal trajectories of the model. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
In recent years relative effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy action on 
economic growth an on social welfare has been debated by both economists and policy 
makers. 
The traditional optimal currency areas literature pointed out long ago that, in a 
monetary union, fiscal policy has to play a more important role in cyclical stabilization 
given the loss of national monetary independence. This is particularly the case if shocks 
are not perfectly correlated across frontiers. Fiscal flexibility, together with budgetary 
discipline and co-ordination, has come to be seen as a central pillar of fiscal policy in a 
currency area . The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has been the operational response of 
EU countries to the quest for budgetary discipline in EMU. 
Recent theoretical and empirical developments have shed new light on the ‘old’ 
issue of the interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities. 
There are numerous studies, both theoretical and empirical, analyzing the relation 
between inflation and long-run growth. 
In the past decade the development of the endogenous growth literature pioneered 
by Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), and Rebelo (1991) has enhanced our understanding 
about how an economy’s growth performance can be affected by public policies. For 
instance, Barro (1990) and King and Rebelo (1990) study the effects of fiscal policies, 
such as government spending and taxation, on economic growth. The general conclusion 
is that taxation adversely affects long-run growth performance and that the quantitative 
impacts are much larger than those found in exogenous growth models. Chari, Jones, and 
Manuelli (1995) and van der Ploeg and Alogoskoufis (1994) examine the effects of 
monetary policies, such as changes in the growth rates of nominal money supplyliter, on 
long-run real activity. These authors find support for the conventional wisdom that 
inflation and long-run growth are inversely related. These studies also represent an 
advance in our understanding of the impact of alternative policies on inflation and 
growth. 
Recently economists have been paying increasing attention to a dynamic general 
equilibrium approach to the theory of price level that is often called the fiscal theory of 
the price level, or FTPL. This way of thinking emphasizes the role of fiscal and monetary 
policy in determining the risk and return properties of government liabilities. It is 
particularly useful in analyzing proposals for large-scale institutional changes that imply 
shifts in monetary and fiscal policies.  
First, the literature on the monetary implications of fiscal (in)discipline, which 
originates with Sargent and Wallace (1981), emphasizes that, to the extent that the path of 
a government's fiscal deficit is predetermined and unsustainable, then monetary policy 
and the price level are no longer exogenous to it. A similar point arises in the context of 
the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (Leepe, 1991, and Woodford, 1995). However, in 
these frameworks the goals of fiscal policy are not explicitly discussed, and do not include macro stabilization. Nevertheless, the scenario analysed by Sargent and Wallace 
has surely been influential in motivating the emphasis on fiscal discipline as a pre-
requisite for monetary stability, which has been placed in the Treaty of Maastricht and, in 
particular, on the design of the criteria for admission to the third phase of EMU. 
A general survey of these issues in neoclassical models is in Chari and Kehoe 
(1999). Issues of coordination also appear in models of the inflation tax or seigniorage 
policy (Barro, 1979; Lucas and Stokey, 1983). In particular, Alesina and Tabellini (1987) 
study the desirability of fiscal and monetary policy coordination in a seigniorage model 





2. The Structure of the Economy 
 
  In our model economy there is a representative household and a government. In 
each period, the government issues currency  , nominal debt   and fix a distortionary 
rate of income tax 
t M t B
t τ to finance the level of public consumption  .  t g
  The sequence of government budget constraints is the following: 
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where   is the nominal interest rate paid on debt issued by the government.  t i
  Technology takes the form: 
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where y is output and k is private capital input. 
 
  The production function of the representative agent satisfies the folowing 
conditions: 
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  We will assume that the economy is closed and the markets are perfectly 
competitive and all prices are flexible. 
 
  Equilibrium on the goods market is: 
 
t t t t t h g c k f y + + = = ) (         ( 4 )  
 
where   is consumption and  is investment.  t c t h
 
The dynamic equation of private capital is the following: 
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respectively. 
Without loss of generality, we assumed that the depreciation rate of  capital is 
zero. 
The initial stock of currency,  , the initial debt liabilities  , and the 
initial stock of private capital,   are given. A government policy is, therefore, a 
specification of {}
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Each period, the representative household faces the following budget constraint: 
  t t t t t t t t t B i M k f B M h c ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1 + + + − = + + + + τ       (8) 
or 
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We will denote by  the wealth of the representative household:  t Z
 
t t t t k B M Z + + =       ( 1 0 )  
 
t t t t t t t t k Z Z k f B i g + − + = + +1 ) ( τ       ( 1 1 )  
 
t t t t t t t B i Z k f Z c + + − = + + ) ( ) 1 ( 1 τ       ( 1 2 )  
 
According to formula (12), it follows that the dynamic equation of the wealth of 
the representative household is: 
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The specific form of the cash constraint is: 
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 Relationship (15) can also be written as: 
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As a matter of fact, relationship (16) can be interpreted as the dynamic equation 
of private capital. 
We notice that if the budget constraint of the representative budget (relation (8)), 
as well as the equilibrium equation (4) are satisfied, then equation (1), which represents 
the government budget constraints, is satisfied. 
We shall suppose that the representative household seeks to maximize a 
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where   and  are increasing, concave functions, and the discount factor satisfies  ) (⋅ U ) (⋅ V
1 0 < <δ . 
 
  We notice in relation (17) that both private consumption and public consumption 
are deflated by the price level  .  t p
 
3. The Model 
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  The model (18) is a dynamic model with discrete variables. It contains two state 
variables ,  and  , and three decision variables,  ,   and  .  t Z t k t c t g t B
  We assume that, for each time period t, the values of  ,   and  t M t p t τ  are given 
exogenously. 
  To deduce the optimal solution of the model (18), we apply the Maximum 
Principle for systems with discrete variables (Altar,1976). 
  The Hamiltonian function of the system is: 
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  We denoted by 
1
t ψ  and 
2
t ψ  the dual variables. 
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and the dynamic equations for the dual variables are: 
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From the above relations it follows: 
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 4. Qualitative Analysis 
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where we denoted by R  the real interest rate. 
 
  Equation (29) emphasizes the fact that the dynamics of the real consumption 
depends on the relationship between the discount factor and the real interest rate. 
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where π  represents the rate of inflation. 
 
If the real interest rate is constant: 
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  Relation (31) highlights the fact that, while the real interest rate remains constant 
and relation (34) is satisfied, the level of real consumption remains constant in time. 
 Concerning  the  relationship between private and public consumption , we obtain 




















= ′                 ( 3 6 )  
 








































) (                    ( 3 8 )  
 


































                   ( 3 9 )  
 
 
  From relation (39) we deduce that the level of public consumption is lower than 
the level of private consumption if the following relations are satisfied: 
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   Next, we will derive the relations between the size of the private capital, the 
nominal interest rate, i, and the fiscality rate, τ . 
  From the dynamics equations (22), (24) and (25) of the dual variable we obtain: 
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From   we obtain the following condition:  0 ≥ t i
 
1 ) ( ) 1 ( − ≥ ′ − t t t i k f τ                     ( 4 4 )  
 
Relation (44) expresses the fact that the level of the capital   has to be chosen in such a 
way that the marginal productivity, 
t K
) ( t k f ′ , adjusted with the fiscality rate  t τ − 1,  h a s  t o  
be higher than the nominal interest rate,  .  1 − t i
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From relation (45), it follows that the level of the private capital increases if the nominal 
interest rates   or   decrease, or if the fiscality rate  t i 1 − t i t τ  decreases. 
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  Formula (46) points out the fact that the size of the stock of nominal government 
debt depends on  private wealth , on the size of the stock of money,  , on the 
nominal interest rates,   and   and on the fiscality rate, 
t Z t M
1 − t i t i t τ . 
  To deduce the dynamic equation of the nominal interest rate, we will take into 
account the relation: 
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  Using relation (47), from (43) it follows: 
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From relation (48), which represents the dynamic equation of the nominal interest rate, it 
follows that   decreases if   increases or if the fiscality rate  t i t M t τ  increases. 
 
Finally, we will show that if relation (30) is satisfied, which insures that the levels of real 
private consumption are equal in the periods t-1 and t (according to relation (31)) and if 
the nominal interest rate satisfies the condition 
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 5. Transversality Conditions 
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If the nominal interest rate is constant: 
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This means that the sequence   should increase slower than the sequence 
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Taking into account the structure of the private wealth,  , which is  T Z
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Next, we will take a look at the information provided by the transversality 
condition (52). 
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and the transversality condition (52) will coincide with (58). So, if the monetary policy 






We studied in this paper a discrete time economic growth model, having elements 
of monetary and fiscal policy. We obtained the dynamic equation of private consumption 
and of public consumption. The dynamics depend on the nominal interest rate and on the 
inflation rate. If the real interest rate coincides with the subjective discount rate, then 
optimal consumption is constant on the whole horizon. The real demand for money is 
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